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Introduction
Beyond a mere geographic feature, the South Atlantic Ocean 
should be understood, historically, as a link between Africa and Brazil. 
The importance of Africa to Brazil and of Brazil to Africa is justified by the 
historic-cultural connections between the two coasts, which was triggered 
by the establishment of a Portuguese presence on the African coast, 
starting on the 15th century. As Costa e Silva puts it, one cannot “[…] write 
Brazilian History without having a Portuguese perspective and an African 
perspective”3 (Costa and Silva 2005, 54).
Thus, the Portuguese Empire, by the mercantile world system – 14th 
to 18th centuries – connected Western Europe, West Africa (and also East) 
and South America (along with Asia), through relations inherent to the 
colonial pact. Then, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the states that achieved 
their independence from Portuguese imperialism (Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, 
Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Angola) kept their 
common grounds, such as cultural aspects, bonds and interests based in the 
South Atlantic.
The concept of system is essential to the understanding of 
international politics; only through a vision of the coherent, complex and 
1  An acronym meaning Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, or African Countries 
with Portuguese as an Official Language.
2  Universidade Federal do Pampa, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 
E-mail: kamilarizzi@unipampa.edu.br
3  The original text as follows: “[...] escrever História do Brasil sem ter uma perspectiva de 
fora, uma perspectiva portuguesa e uma perspectiva africana”.
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dynamic entirety of International Relations (economic, political, ideological, 
cultural, legal, diplomatic and military) it is possible to understand the 
prevalence of politics in the international arena, since states
[…] seek to obtain a more favorable position in the international scenario, 
with the aim of promoting their own interests, influencing in issues and 
problems, increasing their power and changing the power correlation in 
their favor, or even preserving the status quo (Brucan 1974, 63).
The international system, anarchic at its base, is configured by the 
actions and decisions of nation-states, influenced by objective forces that act 
in that system – the structure, capacities and the power relations in a given 
period – motivating the character and the agenda of the relations between 
states, and therefore, the very nature of that system (Brucan 1977, 12). While 
analyzing the historic continuities and breaks in their totality, a definition of 
the world system becomes evident, and it seeks to overcome the dichotomy 
between internal and external factors in the explanation of its dynamics.
The (hegemonic) core and its (subordinate) periphery are concepts 
of a selfsame world system, which elements are interdependent, there being 
no meaning in considering independent data on one hand and subordinate 
data on the other. These states (Brazil and PALOP) are understood as 
peripheral states (Guimarães 1999) in the world system, although with 
marked differences in their participation, resulting from the specific way in 
which each colony and resulting state became independent, structured their 
governments and conducted their foreign relations.
Thus, it is fundamental to understand how the deep forces 
(geographic factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and 
nationalism, as Renouvin and Duroselle 1967) express themselves in these 
countries, as a consequence of historic, political, economic and social 
transformations, in order to analyze the interests at stake in their respective 
bilateral relations, and therefore, in their participation in the world system. 
On the two margins of the Atlantic Ocean, common historical and cultural 
patterns were established (and mixed), originating societies that were 
convergent in ideas and interests, which reflect, necessarily, the relations 
that were established between these peer countries.
The PALOP become apparent as a natural area of focus, interest 
and influence for Portugal and Brazil, due to the historic-social and cultural 
links. In this present study, the three main characteristics that guide Brazil 
PALOP relations in the South Atlantic since 1974/75 will be examined: a) 
the bilateral interaction; b) the multilateral interaction and c) the recurrence 
of the value of the South Atlantic region in the current world system, with 
traces of multipolarity, also identifying how Portugal came to return to the 
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orbit of the PALOP since the decade of 1980.
Due to the disparities between their economic, political, demographic 
and territorial characteristic, it is convenient to define Cape Verde, Guinea 
Bissau and Sao Tomé and Principe as the Small PALOP, as opposed to the 
Large PALOP (Angola and Mozambique). Despite their shared past and the 
characteristics that make them peripheral states in the world system, Angola, 
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tomé and Principe have 
important differences, which become significant in examining their degree 
of development and their participation in the system. The aggregate study of 
these five countries is incomplete, since the fact that they shared the same 
colonial history, and later their post-independence orientation towards the 
adhesion to some form of socialism constitutes an exceedingly frail basis to 
enact general analyses.
The similarities between the Large PALOP vis-a-vis the Small 
PALOP are defined by their historic-cultural conditions, guaranteed by the 
Portuguese presence in their territories, having trade as an axis, adding to 
that the slavery of Africans, whose main destiny was Brazil. The export-
oriented production of agricultural goods through monoculture (sugar, 
cocoa and coffee, mainly), tied to the consolidation of a bureaucratic 
class (that went on to become the post-independence elite), along with 
the development of a mass of unemployed and precariously employed in 
concerning social conditions, delimited the economic, political and social 
structures of these post-colonial states. Chabal (2002) discusses that the 
political africanization that took place in the continent was a consequence 
of the process related to the political legacy of colonialism – ideas, practices 
and institutions – which were “assimilated, transformed and reappropriated 
by Africa”. The privatization of these states, with their foreign investment 
capitalization strategies, are strongly connected to clientelism and corruption 
networks, which ultimately provide most of the necessary resources for its 
maintenance, such as the exchange of goods and services at the personal 
level (along with political support).
Another fundamental aspect of the formation of these post-colonial 
states refers to what Chabal calls hegemonic pursuit, which denotes an 
effort by the state to be absolutely comprehensive in its actions, seeking to 
add dynamism in all spheres of public life, without, however, having the 
effective means to do so. As a result, civil society has “undermined and 
penetrated the state in many ways, contributing to its weakness and failure” 
(Seibert 2002, 23). Therefore, the actions of high-level public servants with 
the effect of privatizing the state (accumulating private wealth in detriment 
of  providing a public service) – many times Portuguese that remained in 
the African territory, or nationals that had their education in Portuguese 
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territory and then returned to their homelands – is examined by Chabal 
(1993; 2002) and Seibert (2002) as resulting from the structure of African 
pre-colonial societies, in which the “[…] accumulation was a means to attain 
positions and social status, enabling the redistribution as a mechanism to 
maintain the social statute and the community’s cohesion” (Seibert 2002, 
23). As a result of its historical conditioning factors linked to Portuguese 
colonialism and to the independence processes, these countries present 
deep structural deficiencies when they develop their participation in the 
world system. These deficiencies affect the infrastructure of basic services 
provided to the population (education, health, sanitation) and of the economy 
(agriculture, cattle raising, public administration, foreign commerce) that 
require modernizations and adequations to the demands of development, 
by means of partnerships with other countries.
Regarding the differences between these two groups of Lusophone 
countries, they are reflected mainly by their geographic dimensions, more 
favorable to the first group, enabling a more sustained development, in 
the medium and long terms, with an abundance of vegetable and mineral 
resources and an agriculture that is not overly dependent on climate and 
soil, unlike the Small PALOP. The size of their borders and their coast make 
Angola and Mozambique countries with greater potential for economic 
development, and therefore, for social development, besides the chance 
for a more solid regional presence, with the possibility of negotiations and 
disputes. On the other hand, the Small PALOP, whose insularity (Cape 
Verde and Sao Tome and Principe due to being archipelagoes; and Guinea 
Bissau, located on the mainland, but amid a Francophone enclave) and 
reduced territorial dimensions hold back their possibilities for development 
and autonomous action, tending to restrict their foreign agenda to historical-
cultural bonds or to issues in their immediate surroundings.
Brazilian foreign policy and its cooperative action towards 
the PALOP: the bilateral path
There is an inherent relationship between the domestic factors 
and the formulation and enacting of a State’s foreign policy. The internal 
and external realms, despite being independent, cannot be researched in a 
wholly independent manner, since their structures, actions and actors are 
linked and cause common effects. Putnam (2010) argues that the discussion 
about which realm has greater influence over the other is irrelevant, 
since both influence one another in a direct and balanced way. Therefore, 
it is up to every state to take into account its domestic responsibilities 
without neglecting its foreign policies. The interconnectedness of the two 
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dimensions requires them to be in an established coherence regarding the 
objectives and the strategies to reach them. In these states, foreign actions 
have been historically connected to the advances and retreats of their 
domestic politics (national viability), according to the period’s world system 
– that is, the degree of international permissibility (Jaguaribe 1980). In the 
case of the PALOP, the degree of complexity between the domestic factors 
and the world system’s constraints have, since their independences, deeply 
conditioned their external action, restricting actions to circumscribed actors 
and demands that remain, inasmuch as the national viability of these 
countries passed through distinct conditions since 1974: the small PALOP, 
with a socialist experiment, with single party regimes, attempted to launch 
the bases for socioeconomic development, however, without success; the 
large PALOP, also with socialist experiments, were mired in internal 
conflicts (with regional and international consequences) and also did not 
manage to advance in the organization of their States and societies until the 
decade of 1990.
In this study, we took as a starting point the analysis of Brazilian 
foreign policy from its fragilities (dependence) and its potential (autonomy) 
regarding the world system. We also agree with Soares de Lima when she 
asserts that the orientations of Brazilian foreign policy result, simultaneously, 
from the necessity of facing the constraints and vulnerabilities caused by 
the participation of the country in the world system, on one hand, and on 
the other, by the “attempt to harness occasional margins for maneuver in 
that system with the objective of redefining its participation” (Soares de Lima 
1990, 10, emphasis added).
By seeking to redefine its participation in the world system 
since 1960, Brazilian foreign policy has increasingly taken into account 
development and South-South relations as possibilities for expanding the 
country’s international relations, in the sense of overcoming the Brazilian 
internal constraints and of those peers, and also reducing their degree of 
dependence regarding the Central States. We add that the Brazilian foreign 
policy toward the PALOP – given the social and economic constraints of 
these countries, which had negative effects on those relations – was based, 
from 1974 to 2015, on a cooperation action caused by the demands, but 
complemented by a political or technical element (depending on the period 
under scrutiny). We extend that concept with the notions brought by Lima, 
arguing with Souza, in which one must also highlight the 
[…] ‘active development policy’ and […] the needs to ‘articulate a national 
project oriented towards overcoming the internal unbalances in the first place’. 
The active participation [of Brazil in the world system] must be sought in 
the ‘harmonization with countries that have interests similar to our own 
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and are willing to resist the impositions of the dominant powers’ (Lima, 
2005, 11, emphasis added)
This external action – whose more precise notion must be understood 
as an active development policy, aiming to configure an influence area for 
the PALOP – was operated with minimally diverse focuses in each stage: 
from 1974 to 1990, the cooperation with a political focus was the emphasis 
of Brazilian foreign policy for the PALOP, within the framework of the 
horizontality that marked Third World thought; from 1990 to 2002, the 
purely technical cooperation was the conduit that maintained Brazilian 
presence in those countries; from 2003 to 2015, that cooperation took on, 
once again, the political focus and sought greater depths in terms of the 
renewed South-South cooperation.
For the PALOP, it is evident that Brazilian foreign policy fits these 
relations with the purpose of establishing a direct influence sphere in that 
African lusophone space, whose external actions – once facing the difficulties 
of Brazilian foreign policy in consolidating economic links – were based on 
development as a vector, made concrete by means of cooperation actions.
Horizontal cooperation (1974-1990)
This first period was marked by the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Brazil and the recently independent PALOP. The years 
of 1974 and 1975 are, thus, fundamental to understand the way in which 
Brazil approached the African South Atlantic coast once more, identifying 
the historic factor as the main conditioning agent (and, conversely, how 
Portugal, as a consequence of the independence process, distanced itself).
 Whereas in the decade of 1950, England and France were preparing 
to transfer their government power to the African colonies, Portugal made 
the following argument about its ultramarine possessions:
[Portugal] gradually made clear that it did not see self determination, 
much less independence, as an option for its African possessions, and 
this understanding consolidated itself over time, apparently determined 
to maintain itself at all costs […]. The Portuguese, moving in the opposite 
direction [of France and England] had not prepared anything that could 
be left to their successors [in Africa] because they had no intention of 
abandoning the continent (Arnold 2005, 307).
In the decade of 1950, the Organization of the United Nations (UN) 
had considerable international authority which was used in order to aid 
African nationalist movements and decolonization. Portugal’s adhesion to 
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the UN only in 1955 (as it had been previously vetoed by the Union of Socialist 
Soviet Republics in 1946 due to Portugal’s colonialist stance) became a focal 
point in discussions. The dissolution of the British, French and Belgian 
empires in the decades of 1950 and 1960 caused Salazar to be skeptical 
of the transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth. In 
December 1960, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved Resolution 
1514 (known as the Anticolonial Declaration).  The external pressure, 
combined with the internal tensions (with an opposition led by intellectuals 
and politicians), in the end of 1960, led Portugal to abandon its isolation 
and to accept to initiate a dialogue for decolonization.
The war in the Portuguese colonies began in Angola, in February 
1961. The examination of that situation by the UN was focused on two 
aspects: the Angola crisis, and the lack of adherence by the Portuguese 
government to the recommendations of that organization. In April, the 
UNGA approved, by 73 votes in favor, two against (Portugal and South 
Africa) and nine abstentions (among which Brazil, France and the United 
Kingdom), the Resolution 1603. Finding that the continuity of disorder 
and conflicts and the lack of measures to diminish inequalities could put 
the maintenance of peace and international security at risk, the Assembly, 
calling on Resolutions 1514 and 1542, decided: on the one hand, to urge 
the Portuguese government to urgently promote reforms that followed the 
Anticolonial Declaration; and on the other, established a subcommittee 
integrated by five members, in charge of investigating the situation. In 
response to international pressure, Portugal created the Free Trade Zone 
between the colonies and the metropole, in the following November.
Moita (1985, 504) identifies that the involvement of the Portuguese 
troops in the struggles for liberation in the African colonies is directly 
connected to the political orientation of the regime. The Carnation 
Revolution, in April 1974, must be similarly understood as the beginning of 
the transfer of power over to the Portuguese colonies in Africa.
While discussing the Portuguese presence in the colonial wars of 
independence, we must follow closely the simultaneous involvement of 
the troops in three conflicts (Angola, starting in 1961; Guinea Bissau, after 
1963; and Mozambique, from 1964), which required a complex military 
and logistical engagement. Chabal (2002, 4) points to the military question 
as determinant of the local complex, along with the issues of the resistance 
and its campaigns/results. The initiative to carry out insurgencies in these 
three colonies followed from a practical and ideological base, in which the 
understanding of the colonial war was the evidence of the intransigence of 
Portugal’s colonialism in refusing the negotiations for the decolonization.
The Treaty of Friendship and Consultations with Portugal (1953) 
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linked Brazil to that country, in that time’s world system. From that moment 
until the beginning of the decade of 1970, Brazilian policy developed an 
official ambiguity towards the colonial question in Africa. If, on one hand, 
there was a political commitment attached to the defense of colonialism 
between Brazil and Portugal, on the other hand, there was an increasingly 
evident interest on the part of Brazil in establishing contact with Portuguese 
colonies in Africa (soon to be independent countries). Its text established 
mutual consultation between the two parts, in international issues, and 
also promoted the Portuguese-Brazilian Community in the world. Brazil 
subordinated its position regarding Portuguese colonies in Africa to 
Portuguese interests, since the document legally embodied the Brazilian-
Portuguese friendship.
The year of 1974 must be understood as a turning point in Brazilian 
policy towards Africa4, and, as a consequence, the end of ambiguity on the 
issue of Portuguese decolonization. The fall of Marcello Caetano, in Portugal, 
in April, favored the definitive resumption of the anti-colonialist and anti-
racist thematic in Brazilian foreign policy5. In June 8th, the following year, 
the Itamaraty, by an official notice, defined, finally, the Brazilian stance as 
irreversibly favorable to the independence of Portuguese former African 
colonies, as well as anticipating the recognition of the Republic of Guinea-
Bissau, which had already declared its independence from Portugal.
By basing itself on the “special bonds of friendship” between 
Portugal and Brazil, and between Brazil and all the African nations, the 
Brazilian stance defined, furthermore, the need of a peaceful solution to 
all independences at stake, which “ensures the respect to all the legitimate 
aspirations of interested peoples”, reiterating the condemnation of “all 
4  Guinea Bissau declared its independence unilaterally in September 23rd 1973, but it was 
only recognized in September 10th 1974, under the official name of Republic of Guinea-
Bissau; Mozambique achieved independence in June 25th 1975, as the People’s Republic of 
Mozambique; Cape Verde became independent in July 5th 1975, as the Republic of Cape 
Verde; Sao Tome and Principe, in July 12th 1975, as the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome 
and Principe; Angola, in November 11th 1975, as the People’s Republic of Angola. In the case 
of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, until 1980 Amilcar Cabral’s ideal of Cape Verde-Guinea 
Bissau Unity was in place, two independent countries governed by a single party (PAIGC). 
All governments in the PALOP were ruled under single party regimes until the decade of 
1990.
5  The emblematic moment in the open defense of decolonization on the part of Brazil – 
which had already begun in the XXVI General Assembly of the United Nations of 1972 – took 
place in 1974, when the Itamaraty received an official communiqué from the Organization 
of African Unity, asking that the country, “as a friend of Portugal, exert its influence with the 
new Portuguese government in favor of the concession of independence to Mozambique and 
Angola, along with the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau” 
(OAU 1974, 67).
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policies of colonialist or racist character”, and did not take on any mediation 
role in the resolution of that situation, but stated that it would offer its 
collaboration if it was requested “by interested parties to which Brazil feels 
linked by history, race and culture” (Problema Português 1974, 67).
There was a convergence of  Brazilian foreign policy for these 
countries (and from these countries towards Brazil), although with two 
distinct stages: a) from 1974 to 1985 (during the presidencies of Geisel and 
Figueiredo), there was an increasing intensity in the political interactions, 
along with the identification of demands in economic relations and 
cooperation possibilities; and b) from 1985 to the first trimester of 1990 
(the Sarney presidency), which was marked by the retraction of contacts, 
especially due to the internal and external constraints in these countries.
Until 1985, the very notion that the country had reached a considerable 
importance, in political and economic terms, in the world system, along 
with its strategic position in the South Atlantic, justified its close links with 
the PALOP. Open ended cooperation agreements were signed with all five 
countries, and these would serve as base documents in future actions, 
presenting the themes of bilateral cooperation projects: health, culture, 
public administration, professional qualification, education, environment, 
sports, human rights, cooperativism and agriculture (signed with Guinea-
Bissau in 1978, Cape Verde in 1977, Angola in 1980, Mozambique in 1981 
and Sao Tome and Principe in 1984), which were complemented over the 
years, accordingly with African demands, by means of adjustments.
The alignment with the Third World, evidenced by the stance 
adopted at the UN of favoring anticolonial movements, was also emblematic, 
given the accusations of neoprotectionism and external indebtedness. A key 
moment in that process was the political activism in alliances and coalitions 
that sought to strengthen the Brazilian participation in multilateral 
organisms, such as the G-77, the Amazonian Pact and the Cartagena Group. 
In the diplomatic documentation of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, there are 
many references to the synonym terms “mutual cooperation”, “conjugated 
interests”, “political coordination”, “mutually satisfactory advantages” and 
even “diplomatic earthmoving efforts”.
In the Sarney government, the creation of the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (ABC, from the Portuguese Agência Brasileira de Cooperação) and 
the Institute for Research and International Relations (IPRI, from the 
Portuguese, Instituto de Pesquisa e Relações Internationais), in December 
1987, under the authority of the Foreign Ministry, demonstrates how the 
demands in the area of cooperation were an important topic in Brazilian 
foreign policy, as a mechanism to complement the political and commercial 
relations. This horizontal cooperation, that would become mostly technical, 
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especially in the areas of health, education and human resources, should 
lead the country’s foreign actions, identifying demands and potentialities. 
In 1989, the President pointed out the relevance of the area in Brazilian 
foreign actions, in the sense of “from outside to within”, but mainly in the 
sense of “from within to abroad”:
The ABC was created to play the role of central organism of the 
international technical cooperation system of the Brazilian government. 
The measure represented a considerable operational advance in the 
treatment given to this matter, since Brazil, previously a mere recipient of 
international cooperation, had developed its own capacity of also cooperate 
with friendly nations in the Southern hemisphere. This evolution has led 
quite naturally to the structuring of the Agency according to two basic 
guidelines: the receiving of technical cooperation, and the technical 
cooperation between developing countries (Sarney 1989, 37).
The configuration of the Brazilian cooperation policy, starting with 
the ABC, was based on the promotion of development (“the solid base for 
overcoming, peacefully, the obstacles to development”, according to Abreu 
Sodré 1989, 63). This cooperation was focused mainly on those sectors of 
the economy considered priorities, both by the donor and the receptor6: 
agribusiness, cattle raising, environment, education, transport, mining, 
irrigation, healthcare, sanitation, social assistance and the qualification of 
human resources7. In 1989, Veiga Cabral analyzed that Brazilian African 
policy, which was in its consolidation efforts:
[…] the common bonds […] tend to grow closer. Brazil seeks Africa 
and Africa seeks Brazil. Objectives very different from those times 
[colonialism]. The main interests are alternatives for economic expansion, 
as well as its repercussions in international politics. On the African side, 
the interests are the basic development of infrastructure and the support 
of one of the leaders of the Third World. Both share a common past, 
colonialism, both seek through South-South dialogue a solution to their 
problems, in the increasingly competitive and exclusive universe of the 
developed. Both, ultimately, seek to enable their complementarities, both 
economic as well as political (Veiga Cabral 1989, 5, emphasis added).
6  Regarding the PALOP, Brazil has always been either a cooperation donor, or an articulator 
of three way cooperation.
7  The partnership between ABC and internal or (especially) foreign agencies (such as the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Development 
Programme, the Organization of American States and the International Labor Organization) 
was standardized from this moment onwards, made possible also by the concept of 
triangulation (the possibility of a developing country to receive cooperation resources from 
a developed country or international organism, to absorb Brazilian technology), whose base 
was Brazil.
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The basis of educational cooperation, the Student Graduation 
Agreement Program (PEC-G, from its Portuguese form, Programa de 
Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação), which had its origin in the end of the 
decade of 1920 (administrated exclusively by the Foreign Ministry until the 
year of 1967), was developed, since then, on the basis of the signature of 
joint protocols, with indeterminate duration, between Education Ministries 
(and Superior Education Institutions) and the Foreign Ministry.
From 1985 to 1990, starting with the stagnation of previous 
actions, due to the internal and international constraints, there was special 
attention to cooperation. And important aspect was the Summit in São Luís, 
Maranhão, in 1989, when President Sarney received the Heads of State 
and Government of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, 
Sao Tome and Principe, and a Special Representative from the President 
of Angola. In this occasion, the International Institute of the Portuguese 
Language (IILP) was created, which objectives were to defend and promote 
the language; to enrich the language as a means for culture, education, 
information and access to scientific and technologic knowledge; develop the 
cultural relations between lusophones; provide incentives to cooperation, 
research and exchange in the realms of culture and language; and spread 
the Orthographic Agreement.
Technical cooperation (1990-2002)
The Brazilian governments from 1990 to 2002 placed the country 
within the post-Cold War world system’s logic, based on neoliberal 
globalization, adding greater importance to the market and to economic 
issues. The relative draining of the Foreign Minister of its prerogatives in 
the decision making process in foreign policy completed that rescaling of 
the country’s foreign positioning, which became oriented towards the global 
North and regional integration, focusing on the MERCOSUL. The African 
continent was confined to the background inasmuch as Brazilian foreign 
policy formulation and enacting was concerned, a fact that is demonstrated 
by the scarce political contacts and a low volume of bilateral trade.
At that moment, there was a reduction of bilateral relations as a 
consequence of the transformations that the post-Cold War world system 
imposed on states, with complex transformations both within Brazil and 
especially on the PALOP (the small PALOP underwent economic and 
political reforms, and the large PALOP, in addition to them, were either 
going through a process of stabilization – Mozambique – or facing a civil 
war – Angola).
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In Cape Verde, only in the year of 1988, with the 3rd Congress of 
the PAICV, the process of internal reforms began. The initial momentum 
was based on the economy, but that soon spilled over into a political 
restructuring, which culminated on the presidential elections of February 
1991, which marked the institutionalization of a multiparty system in 
the country. In Angola, constitutional revisions were made in 1992, 
establishing a semipresidential system, abolishing the death penalty and 
removing the expression “People’s” from the name of the Republic. In the 
case of Mozambique, the Constitution of 1990 introduced in the national 
political system the possibility of organizing political parties, and in 1992 
the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO was ended and the first 
multiparty elections took place in 1994. In Guinea Bissau, in January 1991, 
during the 2nd Extraordinary Congress of the PAIGC, President Nino Vieira 
launched the country’s democratization, altering the Constitution to allow 
political pluralism and the freedoms of speech, association, assembly and 
press. In Sao Tome and Principe, the political transition evolved in parallel 
with economic reform: the new Constitution was approved in March 1990, 
after the neoliberal adjustments of the end of the decade of 1980, defining 
presidential and legislative elections in the same year of 1990; in the end of 
May, the parliament approved the law of political parties.
The line that kept Brazil close to the PALOP in this dynamic period 
of domestic and international change was technical cooperation, which 
by the maintenance of a few projects, allowed the country to maintain a 
minimal continuity with the actions pursued in the previous stage. This 
cooperation, which between 1975 and 1990, was thought of as an horizontal 
relationship, that is, between equals, became, between 1990 and 2002, 
more technical and bureaucratic, with the reduction of projects, budgets 
and human resources.
The only conceptions that were maintained were those of “relative 
neighborhood”, “African presence in Brazil, as the true ethnic and social 
substract of our country […]”, or still “condition of developing country 
which, with differentiated shades and degrees, we share with the totality 
of the African continent […]”, as per the diplomatic statements. The lack 
of economic complementarity was an important obstacle in relations that 
only did not cease because of the understanding of the “great similarity of 
physical, climactic and social conditions between Brazil and many African 
countries” (LAMPREIA, 1995, pg. 202). The selective contacts that were 
maintained at this time between the margins of the South Atlantic were 
based on the CPLP, ZOPACAS and the new South Africa.
The ABC, since its inception, was integrated to the General Secretariat 
of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, but then became an organism of Direct 
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Administration, with the aim of “coordinating, negotiating, approving, 
following up on and evaluating, on a national scope, the development 
cooperation in all areas of knowledge” (Agência 2011). Gradually, the ABC 
expanded the scope of Brazilian cooperation actions with most African 
countries, within the framework of “technical cooperation between 
developing countries”.  Within the scope of the PEC-G and the PEC-PG, as 
well as the PEC-TEC, there was the maintenance of the student exchange 
of about 50 students from the PALOP going to Brazil annually, between 
1990 and 2002, as well as the technical cooperation on the subject of public 
administration, within the “Public Administration Project”, elaborated 
and executed by the FUNDAP, with financing from the UNDP, within the 
concept of three way cooperation.
South-South cooperation (2003-2015)
In the contemporary period, during the governments of Lula da 
Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2015), there was a renewal 
of Brazilian foreign policy to Africa, and especially towards the PALOP. 
The South Atlantic reemerged as a link in these relations, denominated 
by Chancellor Celso Amorim (who was Foreign Minister during Lula’s 
two terms) as a “goodwill belt” (Amorim 2011). A clear concept of foreign 
policy articulated with defense policy was noted, since the South-South 
cooperation was guided by a diplomatic strategy that originated in an 
“authentic wish of exercising solidarity with poorer countries”, but also “to 
help expand Brazilian participation” in the world system, where cooperation 
is coordinated “[…] between equals in matters of trade, investment, science 
and technology and other fields, reinforces our stature and strengthens our 
position in negotiations regarding trade, finances and climate” (Amorim 
2011).
The resumed pragmatism was presented by the President in 
an interview given to the Algerian press, in 2006, about the relations 
with the PALOP as a “politico-diplomatic and cooperation reality” (Silva 
2006). Chancellor Amorim, in a general analysis about the eight years 
of his management, stated that the PALOP are “understandably, those 
with whom Brazil has the longest lasting, most solid and diverse relation” 
(Amorim 2010a, 233). The Itamaraty had its traditional role recovered in the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy as a state policy.
Celso Amorim understood this cooperation as a “diplomatic strategy 
that was originated in an authentic wish of exercising solidarity with poorer 
countries”, but also “to help expand Brazilian participation” in the world 
system, where cooperation is coordinated
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“[…] between equals in matters of trade, investment, science and 
technology and other fields, reinforces our stature and strengthens our 
position in negotiations regarding trade, finances and climate. Lastly, but 
not any less importantly, the construction of coalitions with developing 
countries is also a way of bringing about the reform of global governance, 
with the aim of making international institutions fairer and more 
democratic (Amorim 2010, 230)
In the PALOP, the fifteen years that began in  2000 represented 
decisive moments in their historic evolution, which allowed that greater 
approximation with Brazil, but also with Portugal (and the European Union), 
African powers (Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) and the international 
institutions: Angola ended their civil war in 2002, and has set in motion 
a solid development and regional participation project, which turned 
the country into an African leader, directly competing with Nigeria and 
South Africa in regional affairs, but also among the PALOP; Cape Verde 
consolidated its multiparty democracy, and has increasingly approached the 
European Union, with the argument of being a geographic bridge between 
Europe, Brazil and the PALOP, especially performing in the services sector; 
Guinea Bissau, as in the decade of 1990, deepened its political instability, 
which generated social and economic chaos, becoming one of the main 
concerns in the fields of defense and human security among the PALOP 
(especially in the CPLP); Mozambique also consolidated its democracy 
in the contemporary era, although with political corruption scandals and 
increasing tension between FRELIMO and RENAMO, lately; Sao Tome and 
Principe sought to move gradually towards the institutionalization of its 
democracy, but suffering with political crises and coups in the surrounding 
area, especially after the Gulf of Guinea became an oil exporting area, along 
with Nigeria.
Thus South-South cooperation was consolidated as an instrument 
of the projection of Brazilian foreign policy. From 2003 to today, there 
has been an evolution of the bilateral agenda: deepening actions related 
to development, joining articulated foreign and defense policies, but 
maintaining cooperative action as the main propelling element. Although 
with foreign policy guidelines that were very complementary among 
themselves, there is a difference in emphasis and pragmatism between 
the Lula and the Dilma governments: the first one was more oriented to 
the intense resumption of the African agenda in Brazilian foreign policy, 
especially favored by the programs, projects and actions enacted between 
2003 and 2010; whereas the succeeding government only conserved the 
actions of its predecessor, although with less intensity and no proactivity, 
merely seeking to maintain the extraordinary external and bilateral gains 
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obtained in the preceding period.
The Lula and Dilma governments were marked by the increase in 
cooperation agreements and development programs with Africa, increasing 
the availability of positions in the PEC-G and PEC-PG programs. The 
PALOP established themselves as the main beneficiaries by the cooperation 
agreements, both by the federal institutions and by agreements signed directly 
with private superior education institutions, through religious associations 
or NGOs. The cooperation actions in the areas of public administration and 
human resources qualification, education and agribusiness were configured 
as pillars of Brazilian foreign policy toward the PALOP.
Main aspects of cooperative action: programs and results
Since 1974, cooperative action has been identified as a priority in 
Brazilian foreign policy, due to the demands historically presented by the 
PALOP, going through the variables previously presented (cooperation 
in areas that complemented each other, oriented towards development). 
As articulating agents in the Brazilian state, we can identify the Foreign 
Ministry and the ABC, with a competent and realist performance, in an 
institutionalized cooperation policy. The main area of cooperative action 
in Brazil has become the formation and qualification of African human 
resources (education, agribusiness and public administration).
In education, the formation of teachers for the primary and 
secondary levels, along with the creation of libraries and film libraries, 
and the introduction of education through radio networks were some 
of the main initiatives in the decades of 1970 and 1980. Starting in the 
decade of 2000, the introduction of the Bolsa Escola (“School Grant”) and 
Alfabetização Solidária (“Solidary  Literacy”) increased the advances in those 
areas. Since 1978, the PEC-G, and since the decade of 1990 the PEC-PG 
(similar to the PEC-G, but for post graduation students) have brought, 
in average, 50 students of the PALOP annually for higher education in 
Brazilian institutions – with significant increase in the 2003-2015 period (in 
which an average of 300 students from the PALOP entered Brazil annually).
Regarding cooperation in the area of diplomacy, there was the 
formation of diplomatic cadres since the decade of 1980, at the Rio Branco 
Institute, in Brasília (in average, 2 students per PALOP, per year, with 
grants). On the subject of public administration, there have been semiannual 
courses in the areas of comptrollership and accounting targeting PALOP 
public servants, with the participation of the São Paulo Administrative 
Development Foundation (FUNDAP), of the Public Administration 
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Institute (IBAM) and the School of Finance Administration (ESAF). In the 
legal sector, there has been support from the Brazilian Electoral Justice to 
the electoral census, electoral observers, Superior Electoral Courts, Regional 
Electoral Courts, census and civil registry, especially in the small PALOP.
Cooperation in the agricultural and cattle sectors was developed 
with the participation of EMBRAPA (with a regional office inaugurated 
in 2008, in Ghana), justifying its actions by the Brazilian experience in 
tropical agriculture, in the attempt of changing the low African agricultural 
productivity. There has also taken place the formation of human resources 
(in African and Brazilian territory), the exchange of experiences and 
technologies, exchange of scientific research, support for the production 
of fruit (especially bananas and pineapple) and cereals (such as rice, corn, 
beans and soy), in the raising of cattle (mostly bovines, with the aim of 
extracting milk, and providing techniques for the development of pastures), 
along with the demand for a laboratory of animal pathology, and in the 
extension of rural areas.
In healthcare, there has been the progressive qualification of 
professionals, with specialization programs or internships, by the concession 
of scholarships. Joint research programs in scientific areas of common 
interest (especially referring to tropical diseases), donation of vaccines 
and medication, exchange of specialists and scientists, the organization 
of seminars and conferences, the sending and exchanging of equipment 
and necessary material for the execution of specific projects, also with the 
establishment of a human milk bank, and generally with the strengthening 
of primary care being the focus. The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation has become 
the responsible institution for the exchange of experiences and scientific 
research. Regarding the qualification of commercial and entrepreneurial 
sectors of the workforce, the SENAI, SENAC, SESI and SENAR have 
been the main responsible institutions for the installation of Professional 
Formation Centers in the capitals of the PALOP.
In the area of defense, there have been significant advances in 
the training of officers of the PALOP Armed Forces in Brazil and Africa, 
joint exercises, and constant sales and donations of military equipment. 
However, it is worth noting that there are specific characteristics to Brazilian 
cooperation with the small and the large PALOP: with the first group, the 
actions are still budding, with specific demands, the establishment of 
representations and military attachés, support and training for coast guards 
(such as in Cape Verde) and training of marines (in Sao Tome and Principe); 
in the second group, however, the cooperation actions, that began with the 
same specific actions of the previous groups, advanced and became more 
complex. For instance, in Angola, there has been the implementation of 
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the Program of Angolan Naval Power Development, by means of the Naval 
Projects Managerial Enterprise (EMGEPRON) of the Brazilian Navy. The 
Angolan Naval Program includes, along with the construction of shipyards 
in Angola, the acquisition of six 500 ton patrol ships, the formation of 
human resources for the construction, maintenance and operation of the 
ships, shipyards and maritime surveillance system (the creation of the 
Provisional Joint Defense Committee marks that advance). In the case of 
Mozambique, the sale of materiel has been the emphasis.
The cooperative action through the multilateral path
Brazil recognizes the African continent as an area of privileged 
action, and the South Atlantic is the way to this increased narrowing of 
relations between them. The PALOP, in behalf of historical and social 
matters, became fundamental partners of the Brazilian foreign policy. This 
“good will belt” is a Brazilian priority due to two aspects: 1) the cooperative 
action on the Brazilian foreign agenda, via the bilateral relations pointed 
previously, and via multilateral ones that are consolidated by the Community 
of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and the South Atlantic Peace 
and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) and 2) the repositioning of the South 
Atlantic as a geostrategic region on the contemporary international system. 
In this sense, the CPLP has been the legitimizing tool and the ZOPACAS 
emerged, since 1994, as a promising possibility: both have in their agendas 
the cooperation.
A converging point refers to the Brazil-Portugal relations and their 
consequences for the PALOP and CPLP. The content of the Brazil-Portugal 
relations, historically constituted between closeness and distance, also 
characterized the way and phases of implementation of the CPLP itself. The 
two countries, for the same reasons, but in their respective contexts and local-
regional-international interests (political influence and economic contacts 
based on common history and culture), joined forces for the consolidation 
of the Community, since “it was agreed that Brazil and Portugal would seek 
for joint cooperation actions on PALOP, in order to test the viability of a 
common work in the whole continent” (BRASEMB PRAIA, OF C nº 0031-
00112 1992, 1). After the African independences, Lisbon stood away for 
more than a decade from the former colonies, especially by the traumatic 
way that the independences were conquered (most of them in colonial wars) 
and by the posture of searching for autonomy in the international system 
something intended by the PALOP until de decade of 1990.
The convergence around the Portuguese language, which began 
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in 1989 and extended in the 1990s, was the moment of Portuguese 
rapprochement, now with the Brazilian competition, in PALOP. The 
divergence between Brasília and Lisbon, in PALOP, was about the way 
that the resulting cooperation would take: Portugal identified the Portugal-
Brazil relation in PALOP, in the “equation 2+5=7”, as the “ideal”. The 
Brazilian diplomatic documentation is rich in this sense, since it clarifies 
the understanding that Brazil had of the multilateral partnership (with 
the creation of IILP and after the CPLP), as in the “equation 7=7”, more 
“dynamic and positive”. What prevailed, on this understanding, was the 
Brazilian positioning, which accomplished the Lusophone community 
from a cultural content, but with clear political and economic overtones.
The CPLP was born from the convergence of historical and social 
relations around the maintenance of a common language, having the 
South Atlantic as a facilitator axis. In July 1996, the creation of the CPLP 
converted these aspects around a political and cultural conciliation among 
its members, whose basis started to be the cooperation. Along these eighteen 
years, the action of the CPLP has also expanded to an agreement in other 
areas, especially in defense (after 2006). The promotion of security and 
stability in the South Atlantic, based on the affirmation and protection of 
common values and interests, has been the tonic of this cooperation. As an 
example, the reunion of defense ministers from 1998 in Portugal (Brazil as 
an observer), and the assistance of the Brazilian and Portuguese Marines to 
the Marines of Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.
In 2010, at the XII Meeting of CPLP Defense Ministers, held in 
Brasília, the former minister Nelson Jobim expressed concern relating to 
concrete joint political actions between the two sides of the South Atlantic, 
referring to a political and defense agreement, indicating the ZOPACAS as 
a practicable geopolitical alternative. In 2011, at the XIII Meeting, in Brazil, 
it was settled among the members the “Cooperation Protocol in the Defense 
Domain”. As fruits of this specific cooperation emerged the CPLP Strategic 
Analysis Center (2006) and the uninterrupted accomplishment Felino 
Exercises. The Armed Forces of the CPLP countries have participated in 
military exercises since 2000: at the first two years the Felino Exercises took 
place in Portugal; in 2002, it was held in Brazil; in 2003, Mozambique; in 
2004, Angola; in 2005, Cape Verde; again in Brazil in 2006 (in Petrolina/
PE); in 2007, in Sao Tome and Principe; in 2008, in Portugal; in 2009, 
Mozambique and in 2010, in Angola. In 2013 and 2014, the Exercises 
occurred in Brazil.
Another important point related to the multilateral way, the South 
Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) must be understood 
from the context in which it was suggested and created. In July 1988, Brazil 
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reunited, in Rio de Janeiro, for the first time, the ZOPACAS countries 
delegates to coordinate actions, considering that the Brazilian proposal was 
presumed as “an intra regional understanding effort, of egalitarian nature, 
by the aim of cooperation to peace and security in our region and the 
development of our peoples” (Abreu Sodré 1988, 21), in a historic moment 
that was forwarding to the end of the Cold War changes. The ZOPACAS 
was stated as a concrete effort of regional policy coordination, of multilateral 
nature, led by Brazil, as an instrument of the “materialization of the Atlantic-
African inheritance” according to Penha (1011).
The II Zone Meeting, in June 1990, took place in Abuja and 
represented new lines of action between the member states. However, the 
international background took away its main topic from the Zone:
from the geopolitical view, the relatively significant strategic position 
played by the South Atlantic during the Cold War was gradually losing 
its importance and, with it, the very ZOPACAS idea, precisely created by 
this potential  conflict context (Penha 2011, 188).
The Brazilian diplomatic initiative, in 1992, of relaunch under new 
templates, considering the post-Cold War world system, aimed to foster new 
regional priorities through collective actions. The final version of ZOPACAS 
was an informal arrangement between the countries of the South Atlantic 
basin and the resolutions that institutionalized the Zone, incorporated 
items such as human rights defense, self-determination of peoples, racial 
equality and cooperation in national and regional levels, besides seeking 
encouragement to improvements in regional cargo logistics and in applying 
the international maritime law.
The independence process of Namibia, the democratization of 
South Africa, the normalization of the Argentina-Great Britain relations 
and the peacemaking efforts in Angola contributed to this recovery. The III 
Zone Meeting happened in September 1994, in Brasília, where the States 
members adopted the Declaration  on the  Denuclearization of the  South 
Atlantic, Declaration on the Marine Environment, and the Declaration on 
Business Cooperation in the South Atlantic, along with the establishment of 
a Permanent Committee of the ZOPACAS, responsible for the permanent 
operation of the Zone’s actions. The IV Meeting occurred in Cape Town, 
in 1996. In 1998, in Buenos Aires, the V Meeting took place, emphasizing 
“the necessity to fortify bonds between the two South Atlantic margins and 
consolidate the sub Atlantic region as an important economic basin capable 
of promoting the economic development of the region” (Penha 2011, 190). 
In 2007, the VI ZOPACAS Meeting happened in Luanda and resulted in 
the Luanda Plan of Action; the seventh Ministerial Meeting took place in 
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Montevideo in January, 2013 and culminated in the Montevideo Plan of 
Action, the most complete action proposal of the Zone8.
Final considerations
From these notes, it is understood that, historically, the South 
Atlantic has approached its shores. The political situation has been linked 
to the cooperative action that guided the relationship between Brazil and 
the PALOP, as, since the 1970s, the consolidation of an area of regional 
influence is sought, based on the South Atlantic Ocean, and legitimized by 
the principles of development and universality of the foreign relations of 
the country.
Thus, the opening of the diplomatic representations in Praia, Bissau, 
Maputo, Luanda and São Tomé9 – in the first period of the Brazilian foreign 
policy to these countries – converged with the posture to be present in those 
societies, whose argument of cultural justification and political-diplomatic 
approach generated the demands for bilateral cooperation and glimpsed 
possibilities of commercial exchange. Even with moments of closeness 
(1974/75-1990 and 2003-2015) and distance – with even the reduction of 
the political profile – (1990-2002), the Brazil-PALOP relations remained 
with a certain high level of relationship degree of technical, ministerial and 
business missions, but with low volume of bilateral trade. These ups and 
downs were a direct consequence of the combination of deep forces in those 
countries, with historical, social-political, and economic transformations 
in the past 40 years, which resulted in moments of weakness or action 
potentialities in the world system.
8  The Montevideo Plan of Action contains the objectives, actions and more detailed goals 
of the Zone (counting 124), listing the main issues that are related to the zone performance, 
as global governance, disarmament, peace and security, defense, development (economic 
and financial issues), sustainable development and climate change, oceans and marine 
resources and international crimes (piracy, drug trafficking, weapons and people, money 
laundering and other related crimes). It is detailed the understanding of the Member 
States on mapping and exploration of the seabed, cooperation in the areas of environment, 
maritime transport, air and port security and maritime security, defense, public security and 
combating organized crime, as well as the development capabilities (including the exchange 
of information between the Zone and other regional cooperation mechanisms, such as 
Africa-South America Cooperation Forum and the dialogue between Member States through 
the permanent missions of the United Nations or other forums that are relevant for peace 
and security agenda issues) (PLANO 2013).
9  In 1975, even before the independence, Brazil installed a Special Representation in Luanda, 
in March, under the Ambassador Ovídio de Melo command, and a Special Representation in 
Lourenço Marques, (now Maputo), Mozambique, in April. 
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The South Atlantic has resumed its role of attraction in the 
international system configuration of forces in the XXI century, especially 
by the leaders in their margins – on the west side, Brazil, and, on the 
eastern side, Angola. Brasília increased its influence in all the PALOP, but 
the investments in the Great PALOP expanded, which also started to have 
the presence of Brazilian companies (medium and large).
The educational cooperation – deeply facilitated by language – 
appeared as one of the main instruments of the Brazilian foreign policy 
for PALOP human resources training on Brazilian soil, bringing positive 
results for both countries, for
[...] without considerate the ties and links established throughout their 
academic lives in the country and the institutions that receive them, 
these students are called to return to the countries of origin, as notified, 
immediately after their graduation. This stimulus, argued by the 
associated instances, allows the [immediate] assistance to specific needs 
of the partner governments (up to perform partial studies), as displayed 
in the manual; in other words, there is a requirement to return to the 
country all the investment made on the education of the individual 
(Desidério 2005, 8).
By collaborating with the creation of an intellectual elite and 
policy made from PALOP (competing directly with the Portuguese Higher 
Education Institutions), Brazil emphasizes that these former students 
return to their countries to assist in the development and institutional 
strengthening, undertaking new standards of socioeconomic behavior 
taught by Brazilian professionals, from a Brazilian experience.
Brazil, thereby, has undertaken and depth, from 1974/75, the 
cooperation agreements with the PALOP, identifying the corresponding 
demands and providing its expertise and human and financial resources 
in the formation of programs and projects. These, increasingly specific to 
certain sectors of the involved societies, have sought to improve the living 
conditions and the development of these countries, in the sense of South-
South cooperation, since this type of relationship
between the Portuguese-speaking countries should be considered beyond 
the economic aspect, which limits the cooperation to the effort of  market 
integration.  In fact, its design must assume the educational and cultural 
meaning of becoming closer countries and cultures, in a process marked 
by the permanent dialogue, allowing the awakening of new possibilities 
in the consolidation of a widest integration […] (Education 2007, 9).
Another feature that complements the cooperative action was 
the creation (in the 1980s) and the maintenance of the bilateral Mixed 
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Committees, a field where the African demands and cooperation possibilities 
became to be identified within the framework of ministerial meetings and 
gatherings with representatives of their respective civil societies.
Is important to emphasize that, although the cooperative action is 
the basis of the Brazil-PALOP relations 40 years ago, there is an elementary 
basic and generalist design of projects and programs applied to the five 
PALOP, as the basic Projects of Social Security Modernization, Legal 
Training of Trainers and Magistrates, Implementation of a Human Milk 
Bank and a Lactation Center, Implementation of Tele-Health Center and 
Technical Training Center, in partnership with SENAI.
However, there are important differences in perception, scope 
and number of agents involved in this operation for the Small and the 
Large PALOP: in the Small PALOP, it is identified the more generalist 
programs and projects and others more specifics, especially demanded by 
the local governments with the aim of remedy a particular area for a certain 
period (as an example, the implementation project of a cashew peduncle 
processing unit and other tropical fruits in Guinea-Bissau; the Housing 
Development Support Project in Cape Verde or the Desalination in Ribeira 
da Barca). Regarding the Great PALOP, although they have the same range 
of cooperation projects and programs, is denoted a wider scope and with 
a greater number of local and Brazilian agents involved and, sometimes, 
a higher volume of resources, complexity and technology degree covered 
(for example, actions around the EMGEPRON/Angola, the ProSAVANA 
Projects, and the construction of an antiretroviral drugs/Mozambique). 
Clearly, these differences are the direct results of their own socio-economic 
disparities and of dimension between the Small and Large PALOP, 
discussed above.
Anyway, this “development action among equals”, which may be 
more egalitarian in theory than in practice, has effectively occurred since 
the PALOP became independent, whereas the Brazilian presence in these 
territories has expanded since the 1970s (although with reluctance from 
1990 to 2002). The Brazilian diplomacy recognizes the relevance of the 
PALOP, which have, in Brazil, a partner capable of supplying part of 
their basic demands and has sought government after government the 
maintenance of these ties. So, if “… there is no foreign policy act that does 
not have an internal policy aspect” (Duroselle 2000, 56), it is understood 
that internal and external conditions have directly influenced the level of 
these bilateral relations in certain periods, but not their content.
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ABSTRACT
The celebration of 40 years of independence from Portuguese-speaking African 
Countries (PALOP) is critical to understand the historical and social, economic 
and integration into the world system of these former Portuguese colonies in 
Africa. The socialist experiments in the 1970s and 1980s, the external constraints, 
economic reform and the move towards a multi-party in the 1990s and the attempt 
to stabilize and develop in the 2000s, show an overview of successes and failures 
in the construction of five young countries. This article examines historically the 
political, economic, social and diplomatic path traveled by the five PALOP, based 
on the argument that these countries (although staying in the orbit of the former 
metropolis, especially after the 1980s), approached strategically from Brazil as basis 
of their political and cultural premises for their survival in the world system.
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